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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.\1\lERICAN SMELTING &
REFINING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

Case No.
10084

-vsSTATE TAX C0l\1l\1ISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

This is an appeal from a decision of the State Tax
Commission of Utah. The question presented is whether or
not the claim for refund of plantiff, American Smelting &
Hefining Company, of a portion of its 1956 Utah franchise
tax is barred by the statute of limitations, Section 59-13-43,
U.C.A. 1953.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION

The Tax Commission refused to grant the plaintiff's
claim for refund, holding that it was barred by the statute
of limitations.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Commission's decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, American Smelting & Refining Company,
is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State
of New Jersey, and is qualified to transact business in the
State of Utah.
On December 31, 1956 the company requested an extension of time, until October 15, 1957, in which to file its
consolidated franchise tax return and pay the tax for the
calendar year ending December 31, 1956. The return was
due April15, 1957. On January 7, 1957 the Tax Commission
granted the taxpayer an extension of time to October 15,
1957 as requested by the taxpayer to pay the tax. Such
extension was for six months as provided under Section
59-13-25(2) U.C.A. 1953. Subsequently, the taxpayer paid
the tax as follows: April 10, 1957, $11,000.00; June 7, 1957,
$11,000.00; September 11, 1957, $8,000.00; October 14, 1957,
$5,631.44. The total tax due on the company's return filed
October 14, 1957 was $35,631.44.
The company's federal income tax return for 1956 was
adjusted by the Internal Revenue Service on September
16, 1960, which, if promptly accounted for on its 1956 Utah
franchise tax return, would have permitted a refund from
the State Tax Comn1ission to the taxpayer of $695.30, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
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(lnnum. The taxpayer then filed a claim for refund with
the State Tax Commission of Utah on the 25th day of November. 1960. The time elapsed between the date of the
l~&st payment, made on October 14, 1957, to the date of
filing for a refund on November 25, 1960, was three years,
one month and ten days.
The taxpayer made no agreement with the U. S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue for an extension of the
period for proposing and assessing deficiences in its Federal Income Tax for the taxable year 1956. (R 27)
The rlaim for refund was denied by the State Tax
Commission after a formal hearing before the Tax Commission on January 9, 1964.
The plaintiff contended that the statute did not begin
to run until after that time, or in other words, until December 15, 1957, the last day of the 1957 fourth quarter.
The defendant denied plaintiff's claim, holding that
the three year statute of limitation for claiming refund had
run from the time the last payment was made, as that was
the date the taxpayer had agreed to make its last payment.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
\VHERE .A TAXPAYER PAYS THE TAX,

THE
'l'HREE ·yE_-\R STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR RE-
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FUND BEGINS TO RUN FROM THE TIME THE TAX
WAS "PAID."
The section in 59-13-43, U.C.A. 1953, dealing with the
time limitation for credits and refunds, reads af follows:
59-13-43(2)(a). "No such credit or refund shall be
allowed or made after three years from the time the
tax was paid, unless before the expiration of such
period a claim therefor is filed with the tax commission by the taxpayer." (Emphasis added.)
The section relied on by the Tax Commission to bar
plaintiff's claim for refund is Section 2(a) above, "No such
refund shall be allowed or made after three years from the
time the tax was paid ... "
Plaintiff's claim for refund was made three years, one
month and ten days from the time the last payment was
made on the tax.
In the excellent work of Cooley, Taxation, Vol. 3, 4th ed.,
Sec. 1304, p. 2593, Statute of Limitations, it states:
"The time allowed for bringing the action is
generally fixed by statute ... As the cause of action
accrues at the time of payment, the statute of limitations begins to run from that time, even though
the illegality may not have been known." (Emphassis added.)
F 1ootnote cites Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab Co.,

22 Utah 396, 62 Pac. 1024.
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Further, as stated in 84 C.J.S., p. 1298:
"If there are special statutes of limitation ap-

plicable to actions for the recovery of taxes paid,
and such statutes are valid, the action is barred
unless brought within the prescribed time after the
cause of action has accrued ... "
And. page 2594:

" ... Except insofar as statutes may otherwise
provide. the limitation period generally runs from
the time the taxes are paid, and is not postponed
until the legality of the tax has been judicially determined, or the taxpayer discovers that the assessment, levy and collection were illegal. .. "
(Emphasis added.)
The Centennial case, cited above, states on page 404:
"'When a party pays an unlawful tax under

protest, a cause of action ... at once accrues in
favor of such party to recover such tax; the statute
of limitations begins to run from the date of such
payment . .. " (Emphasis added.)
.And a follow-up case, citing the Centennial case, supra,
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Matson et al., 64 Utah 214, 228
Pac. 755, is directly in point. In that case the plaintiff company paid a tax on the privilege of dealing in trading
stamps betweenJ January 1, 1916 and January 1, 1917. The
Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah
563. 200 Pac. 894, subsequently determined this tax unconstitutional. The plaintiff in that case contended that the
statute of limitations did not begin to run when the tax
\Yas paid but when the H oltgreve case determined the stat-
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ute unconstitutional. In reply to this, the court in the
Sperry case held, on pages 218 and 219:
"We dismiss without comment the contention
of the plaintiff that the cause of action did not begin to run until the statute was declared unconstitutional in the Holtgreve case in September, 1921.
Plaintiff says it did not know the statute was unconstitutional until it was declared to be so in the
Holtgreve case... The contention on its face has
the appearance of being sham and disingenuous.
In any event, the ti1ne in w hie h to commence the
action began to run when the money teas paid to
the officer." (Emphasis added.)
The court said further, at p. 220, that "the proposition is
so utterly untenable as to be undeserving of extended comment." Also see Raleigh v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 130,
53 Pac. 974, and Neilson v. Sanpete County, 40 Utah 560,
123 Pac. 334.

POINT II
WHERE A TAXPAYER DOES NOT FILE ITS REr-1,URN OR PAY ITS UTAH FRANCHISE TAX ON TIME,
.A.N EXTENSION MAY BE GRANTED BY THE TAX
COMMISSION FOR SIX MONTHS, BUT NOT FOR FOUR
QUARTERS, UNDER SECTION 59-13-25(2), U.c·.A. 1953.
The plaintiff's brief in paragraph 3 of its statement of
facts misstates the facts and the law in the case. Plaintiff
contends it elected to pay the franchise tax in four quarterly installments as provided in Section 59-13-25(1), U.C.A.
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1953. The statement is misleading and incorrect. Plaintiff
could not and did not so elect to pay the tax.

Section 59-13-25( 1) permits a taxpayer who has filed
" return by April 15th following the taxable year to pay
his tax in four quarterly installments. The plaintiff did not
file a return on that date because it could not. Instead, it
requested an extension of time to file the return;, which
extension was granted by the defendant, pursuant to a
different section of the Code, Section 59-13-25(2), U.C.A.
1953.
Section 59-13-25(2) gives the Tax Commission authority to grant an extension of time of payment:
··Extension of Time of Payment.
(2) At the request of the taxpayer, the tax
commission may extend the time for payment of
the amount determined as the tax by the taxpayer,
or any part thereof, for a period not to exceed
six months from the date prescribed for the payment of the ta.x. In such case the amount in respect
of ""hich the extension is granted shall be paid on
or before the date of the expiration of the period of
the extension.''
The appellant's request for an extension is as follows
(H. 66):

''We hereby request an extension of time to
October 15, 1957 irr which to file our Consolidated
Franchise Tax Return for the calendar year 1956
covering the American Smelting and Refining Company. Federated Metals Corporation (Pennsylvania)
and Lone Star Lead Construction Corporation. This
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request for extension is necessary because the information to complete the Return will not be available to enable us to file before the requested extension date."
The Tax Commission granted this request by form
letter dated January 7, 1957, which said letter stated
(R.67):
"In compliance with your request, your are
hereby granted an extension of time to October 15,
1957 within which to file your corporation franchise
tax return and pay any tax due for the taxable year
ended December 31, 1956."
It is obvious from the language of the plaintiff's letter
that their return could not be filed on time. And without
such a filing, no formal payments could be made. Because
the taxpayer in fact paid at four different times, it does
not follow that these were quarterly installments. Under
the extension, the tax could have been paid in one installment or fifty, but all of it was to have been paid before
October 15, 1957. Therefore, the due date of the tax was
October 15, 1957 and not at the end of of the 1957 fourth
quarter as alleged by the plaintiff.
In fact, the Tax Commission had no statutory authority to grant an extension for the length of time plaintiff
claims it was entitled, i.e., four quarters, under Section
59-13-25. Plaintiff by so claiming is attempting to repudiate
its own extension agreement. Its 1956 tax and return was
due on April 15, 1957. The only way it could avoid a penalty and interest for failure to file on that date was to ob-
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tain a courtesy extension, which it did. However, plaintiff
could not as a matter of right file at a later date without
the extension. Now plaintiff wants the advantage of the
extension to avoid the interest and penalty for failure to
file on time, but doesn't want the resulting disadvantage
which accrues when its refund is denied by the statute
of limitations. Therefore, under this reasoning, the plaintiff
has an alternative: either the statute of limitations applies
and its claim for refund of $695.00 is denied, or it repudiates its extension agreement and is liable in the amount of
S11.043.86 penalty and interest for failure to file and p:1y
the tax on time. See Sections 59-13-27 and 59-13-30(1)(a).

POINT III
WHERE A TAXPAYER FILES A REPORT OF
CHANGE OR CORRECTION OF FEDERAL INCOME
'l'AX AFTER THE UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
F'OR REFUND HAS RUN, SECTION 59-13-40, U.C.A.
1953, PROVIDING FOR A SUSPENSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS INAPPLICABLE.
Section 59-13-40, U.C.A. 1953, is totally inapplicable to
the instant case. This section in essence provides that a
taxpayer whose net income is "changed" or "corrected"
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue can file a report
of such change or correction with the State Tax Commission within 90 days therefrom. But if such report is not
filed, then the taxpayer is not entitled to the 90-day reassessment period.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
In the instant case, American Smelting cannot claim
the statute. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue adjusted its 1956 tax on September 16, 1960, 28 days before the
Utah statute of limitations for a refund had run. Then, the
taxpayer filed a claim for a refund with defendant on November 25, 1960, 70 days after the federal government
adjusted its tax, and 42 days after the Utah statute of limitation had run on its claim for refund.

Therefore, the plaintiff is barred as a matter of law
from claiming the advantage of Section 59-13-40, U.C.A.
1953.

CONCLUSION
The American Smelting & Refining Company's claim
for refund is barred by the statute of limitations. The statute began to run upon payment by the taxpayer as it did
in the Centennial, Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab Co., 22 Utah
396, 62 Pac. 1024, and Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Matson et al., 64 Utah 214, 228 Pac. 755 cases, supra, and as its
claim was not submitted within the three year period, the
State Tax Commission is now without the power to grant
plaintiff relief.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT !{ESLER,
Attorney General
DEL B. ROWE,
Assistant Attorney General
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